94 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
94 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
# Security POC Test Results
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## Executive Summary
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This report contains the results of proof-of-concept tests demonstrating
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vulnerabilities identified in the nanobot security audit.
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## Test Environment
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- **Date:** Wed Feb 4 02:06:02 UTC 2026
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- **Platform:** Docker containers (Python 3.11)
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- **Target:** nanobot application
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## Vulnerability 1: Shell Command Injection
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**Severity:** MEDIUM
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**Location:** `nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py`
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### Description
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The shell tool uses `asyncio.create_subprocess_shell()` which passes commands
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directly to the shell. While a regex pattern blocks some dangerous commands,
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many bypass techniques exist.
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### POC Results
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See: `results/shell_injection_results.json`
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### Bypasses Demonstrated
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- Command substitution: `$(cat /etc/passwd)`
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- Base64 encoding: `echo BASE64 | base64 -d | bash`
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- Alternative interpreters: `python3 -c 'import os; ...'`
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- Environment exfiltration: `env | grep KEY`
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### Recommended Mitigations
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1. Use `create_subprocess_exec()` instead of shell execution
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2. Implement command whitelisting
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3. Run in isolated container with minimal permissions
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4. Use seccomp/AppArmor profiles
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---
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## Vulnerability 2: Path Traversal / Unrestricted File Access
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**Severity:** MEDIUM
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**Location:** `nanobot/agent/tools/filesystem.py`
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### Description
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The `_validate_path()` function supports a `base_dir` parameter for restricting
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file access, but this parameter is never passed by any of the file tools,
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allowing unrestricted file system access.
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### POC Results
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See: `results/path_traversal_results.json`
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### Access Demonstrated
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- Read `/etc/passwd` - user enumeration
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- Read environment variables via `/proc/self/environ`
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- Write files to `/tmp` and other writable locations
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- List any directory on the system
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### Recommended Mitigations
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1. Always pass `base_dir` parameter with workspace path
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2. Add additional path validation (no symlink following)
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3. Run with minimal filesystem permissions
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4. Use read-only mounts for sensitive directories
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---
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## Dependency Vulnerabilities
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### litellm (Current: >=1.61.15)
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- Multiple CVEs in versions < 1.40.16 (RCE, SSRF)
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- Current version appears patched
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- **Recommendation:** Pin to specific patched version
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### ws (WebSocket) (Current: ^8.17.1)
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- DoS vulnerability in versions < 8.17.1
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- Current version appears patched
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- **Recommendation:** Pin to specific patched version
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---
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## Conclusion
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The POC tests confirm that the identified vulnerabilities are exploitable.
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While some mitigations exist (pattern blocking, timeouts), they can be bypassed.
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### Priority Recommendations
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1. **HIGH:** Implement proper input validation for shell commands
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2. **HIGH:** Enforce base_dir restriction for all file operations
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3. **MEDIUM:** Pin dependency versions to known-good releases
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4. **LOW:** Add rate limiting to authentication
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