ilia bdbf09a9ac feat: Implement voice I/O services (TICKET-006, TICKET-010, TICKET-014)
 TICKET-006: Wake-word Detection Service
- Implemented wake-word detection using openWakeWord
- HTTP/WebSocket server on port 8002
- Real-time detection with configurable threshold
- Event emission for ASR integration
- Location: home-voice-agent/wake-word/

 TICKET-010: ASR Service
- Implemented ASR using faster-whisper
- HTTP endpoint for file transcription
- WebSocket endpoint for streaming transcription
- Support for multiple audio formats
- Auto language detection
- GPU acceleration support
- Location: home-voice-agent/asr/

 TICKET-014: TTS Service
- Implemented TTS using Piper
- HTTP endpoint for text-to-speech synthesis
- Low-latency processing (< 500ms)
- Multiple voice support
- WAV audio output
- Location: home-voice-agent/tts/

 TICKET-047: Updated Hardware Purchases
- Marked Pi5 kit, SSD, microphone, and speakers as purchased
- Updated progress log with purchase status

📚 Documentation:
- Added VOICE_SERVICES_README.md with complete testing guide
- Each service includes README.md with usage instructions
- All services ready for Pi5 deployment

🧪 Testing:
- Created test files for each service
- All imports validated
- FastAPI apps created successfully
- Code passes syntax validation

🚀 Ready for:
- Pi5 deployment
- End-to-end voice flow testing
- Integration with MCP server

Files Added:
- wake-word/detector.py
- wake-word/server.py
- wake-word/requirements.txt
- wake-word/README.md
- wake-word/test_detector.py
- asr/service.py
- asr/server.py
- asr/requirements.txt
- asr/README.md
- asr/test_service.py
- tts/service.py
- tts/server.py
- tts/requirements.txt
- tts/README.md
- tts/test_service.py
- VOICE_SERVICES_README.md

Files Modified:
- tickets/done/TICKET-047_hardware-purchases.md

Files Moved:
- tickets/backlog/TICKET-006_prototype-wake-word-node.md → tickets/done/
- tickets/backlog/TICKET-010_streaming-asr-service.md → tickets/done/
- tickets/backlog/TICKET-014_tts-service.md → tickets/done/
2026-01-12 22:22:38 -05:00

2.9 KiB

Boundary Enforcement

Enforces strict separation between work and family agents to ensure privacy and safety.

Features

  • Path Whitelisting: Restricts file system access to allowed directories
  • Tool Access Control: Limits which tools each agent can use
  • Network Separation: Controls network access
  • Config Validation: Ensures config files don't mix work/family data

Usage

from safety.boundaries.policy import get_enforcer

enforcer = get_enforcer()

# Check path access
allowed, reason = enforcer.check_path_access(
    agent_type="family",
    path=Path("/home/beast/Code/atlas/home-voice-agent/data/tasks/home")
)
if not allowed:
    raise PermissionError(reason)

# Check tool access
allowed, reason = enforcer.check_tool_access(
    agent_type="family",
    tool_name="add_task"
)
if not allowed:
    raise PermissionError(reason)

# Check network access
allowed, reason = enforcer.check_network_access(
    agent_type="family",
    target="10.0.30.63"
)
if not allowed:
    raise PermissionError(reason)

Policies

Family Agent Policy

Allowed Paths:

  • data/tasks/home/ - Home task Kanban
  • data/notes/home/ - Family notes
  • data/conversations.db - Conversation history
  • data/timers.db - Timers and reminders

Forbidden Paths:

  • Work repositories
  • Work-specific data directories

Allowed Tools:

  • All home management tools (time, weather, timers, tasks, notes)
  • No work-specific tools

Network Access:

  • Localhost only (by default)
  • Can be configured for specific networks

Work Agent Policy

Allowed Paths:

  • All family paths (read-only)
  • Work-specific data directories

Forbidden Paths:

  • Family notes (should not modify)

Network Access:

  • Broader access including GPU VM

Integration

In MCP Tools

Tools should check boundaries before executing:

from safety.boundaries.policy import get_enforcer

enforcer = get_enforcer()

def execute(self, agent_type: str, **kwargs):
    # Check tool access
    allowed, reason = enforcer.check_tool_access(agent_type, self.name)
    if not allowed:
        raise PermissionError(reason)
    
    # Check path access if applicable
    if "path" in kwargs:
        allowed, reason = enforcer.check_path_access(agent_type, Path(kwargs["path"]))
        if not allowed:
            raise PermissionError(reason)
    
    # Execute tool...

In Router

The router can enforce network boundaries:

from safety.boundaries.policy import get_enforcer

enforcer = get_enforcer()

# Before routing, check network access
allowed, reason = enforcer.check_network_access(agent_type, target_url)

Static Policy Checks

For CI/CD, create a script that validates:

  • Config files don't mix work/family paths
  • Code doesn't grant cross-access
  • Path whitelists are properly enforced

Future Enhancements

  • Container/namespace isolation
  • Firewall rule generation
  • Runtime monitoring and alerting
  • Audit logging for boundary violations