✅ TICKET-006: Wake-word Detection Service - Implemented wake-word detection using openWakeWord - HTTP/WebSocket server on port 8002 - Real-time detection with configurable threshold - Event emission for ASR integration - Location: home-voice-agent/wake-word/ ✅ TICKET-010: ASR Service - Implemented ASR using faster-whisper - HTTP endpoint for file transcription - WebSocket endpoint for streaming transcription - Support for multiple audio formats - Auto language detection - GPU acceleration support - Location: home-voice-agent/asr/ ✅ TICKET-014: TTS Service - Implemented TTS using Piper - HTTP endpoint for text-to-speech synthesis - Low-latency processing (< 500ms) - Multiple voice support - WAV audio output - Location: home-voice-agent/tts/ ✅ TICKET-047: Updated Hardware Purchases - Marked Pi5 kit, SSD, microphone, and speakers as purchased - Updated progress log with purchase status 📚 Documentation: - Added VOICE_SERVICES_README.md with complete testing guide - Each service includes README.md with usage instructions - All services ready for Pi5 deployment 🧪 Testing: - Created test files for each service - All imports validated - FastAPI apps created successfully - Code passes syntax validation 🚀 Ready for: - Pi5 deployment - End-to-end voice flow testing - Integration with MCP server Files Added: - wake-word/detector.py - wake-word/server.py - wake-word/requirements.txt - wake-word/README.md - wake-word/test_detector.py - asr/service.py - asr/server.py - asr/requirements.txt - asr/README.md - asr/test_service.py - tts/service.py - tts/server.py - tts/requirements.txt - tts/README.md - tts/test_service.py - VOICE_SERVICES_README.md Files Modified: - tickets/done/TICKET-047_hardware-purchases.md Files Moved: - tickets/backlog/TICKET-006_prototype-wake-word-node.md → tickets/done/ - tickets/backlog/TICKET-010_streaming-asr-service.md → tickets/done/ - tickets/backlog/TICKET-014_tts-service.md → tickets/done/
2.9 KiB
2.9 KiB
Boundary Enforcement
Enforces strict separation between work and family agents to ensure privacy and safety.
Features
- Path Whitelisting: Restricts file system access to allowed directories
- Tool Access Control: Limits which tools each agent can use
- Network Separation: Controls network access
- Config Validation: Ensures config files don't mix work/family data
Usage
from safety.boundaries.policy import get_enforcer
enforcer = get_enforcer()
# Check path access
allowed, reason = enforcer.check_path_access(
agent_type="family",
path=Path("/home/beast/Code/atlas/home-voice-agent/data/tasks/home")
)
if not allowed:
raise PermissionError(reason)
# Check tool access
allowed, reason = enforcer.check_tool_access(
agent_type="family",
tool_name="add_task"
)
if not allowed:
raise PermissionError(reason)
# Check network access
allowed, reason = enforcer.check_network_access(
agent_type="family",
target="10.0.30.63"
)
if not allowed:
raise PermissionError(reason)
Policies
Family Agent Policy
Allowed Paths:
data/tasks/home/- Home task Kanbandata/notes/home/- Family notesdata/conversations.db- Conversation historydata/timers.db- Timers and reminders
Forbidden Paths:
- Work repositories
- Work-specific data directories
Allowed Tools:
- All home management tools (time, weather, timers, tasks, notes)
- No work-specific tools
Network Access:
- Localhost only (by default)
- Can be configured for specific networks
Work Agent Policy
Allowed Paths:
- All family paths (read-only)
- Work-specific data directories
Forbidden Paths:
- Family notes (should not modify)
Network Access:
- Broader access including GPU VM
Integration
In MCP Tools
Tools should check boundaries before executing:
from safety.boundaries.policy import get_enforcer
enforcer = get_enforcer()
def execute(self, agent_type: str, **kwargs):
# Check tool access
allowed, reason = enforcer.check_tool_access(agent_type, self.name)
if not allowed:
raise PermissionError(reason)
# Check path access if applicable
if "path" in kwargs:
allowed, reason = enforcer.check_path_access(agent_type, Path(kwargs["path"]))
if not allowed:
raise PermissionError(reason)
# Execute tool...
In Router
The router can enforce network boundaries:
from safety.boundaries.policy import get_enforcer
enforcer = get_enforcer()
# Before routing, check network access
allowed, reason = enforcer.check_network_access(agent_type, target_url)
Static Policy Checks
For CI/CD, create a script that validates:
- Config files don't mix work/family paths
- Code doesn't grant cross-access
- Path whitelists are properly enforced
Future Enhancements
- Container/namespace isolation
- Firewall rule generation
- Runtime monitoring and alerting
- Audit logging for boundary violations